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abSTraCT
according to the standard view, Montaigne’s Pyrrhonian doubts would be in the origin of 
Descartes’ radical Sceptical challenges and his cogito argument. although this paper does not 
deny this influence, its aim is to reconsider it from a different perspective, by acknowledging 
that it was not Montaigne’s Scepticism, but his Stoicism, which played the decisive role in the 
birth of the modern internalist conception of subjectivity. Cartesian need for certitude is to be 
better understood as an effect of the Stoic model of wisdom, which urges the sage to build an 
inner space for self-sufficiency and absolute freedom. 
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SCEPTICISM, SToICISM, SUbJECTIVITy, MIChEL DE MoNTaIgNE, rENé DES-
CarTES
1 I would like to acknowledge funding from the Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación, 
Programa Nacional de Movilidad de recursos humanos del Plan Nacional de I-D+i 2008-2011 
of the Spanish government.
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rESUMEN
Según el punto de vista general, las dudas pirronianas de Montaigne se situarían en el origen 
de los desafíos escépticos radicales del argumento cogito de Descartes. Si bien este artículo 
no niega tal influencia, nuestro objetivo es reconsiderarla desde una perspectiva diferente me-
diante el reconocimiento de que no fue el escepticismo de Montaigne sino su estoicismo el que 
jugó un papel decisivo en el nacimiento del concepto moderno internalista de la subjetividad. 
La necesidad cartesiana de certeza se entiende mejor como un efecto del modelo estoico de 
sabiduría, el cual impulsa al sabio a construir un espacio interior para la autosuficiencia y la 
libertad absoluta.
PaLabraS CLaVE 
ESCEPTICISMo, ESToICISMo, SUbJETIVIDaD, MIChEL DE MoNTaIgNE, rENé 
DESCarTES.
I. CartesIan questIons
the desIre to be post-CartesIan might be the only aim that is commonly 
shared by almost each and every current scholar in philosophy of mind. but 
escaping from the long shade of Cartesianism is not easy, since our obsession 
to find alternative solutions to the problems that Descartes put forward might be 
hiding a deeper perseverance in his tradition. Briefly: by denying his answers, 
we might be inconspicuously accepting his questions. The moment might have 
come, when instead of finding new answers to old Cartesian questions, we 
should perhaps enquire about the questions themselves, about their pertinence 
and coherence, and about the reasons that brought us to accept them. 
It is well known that Descartes tried to avoid any kind of presupposition 
when he chose the set of theoretical questions he would face in his Meditations, 
struggling to formulate them in a way that would not take anything for gran-
ted; but it is questionable whether he did succeed. Some of the most influential 
questions Descartes addressed to upcoming philosophers are: 
(1) what am I?
(2) How do I know there is an outer world? 
(3) are there other minds besides mine?
although those questions appear to be as old as philosophy itself, they 
could hardly have been posed before Descartes. Up to that time, it was more 
common to ask:
(1’) who am I?
(2’) What do I know about the world?
(3’) how can I judge the lives of others?
The former questions make assumptions that were not present in the latter 
ones –although those also certainly do make their own assumptions. For ins-
tance, by asking (1), I assume that I am something, whereas by asking (1’) I just 
assume that I am someone, which is quite a different point. Cartesian question 
245Scepticism, Stoicism and Subjectivity
Contrastes vol. XV (2010)
(1) raised the modern problem of personal identity, from Locke and Hume to 
Parfit, by taking for granted that that someone that I am must be something in 
the world.2 
By the same token, question (2) presumes that I am not really part of the 
world as an outer world, whereas in (2’) I am included in the world I am asking 
about; in this sense, there was no room for idealism in pre-Cartesian philosophy, 
or for the problem of the very existence of the outer world; a point that was 
convincingly shown by burnyeat.3 while classic Sceptical arguments were di-
rected against particular beliefs –since each one of them could be proved to be 
uncertain one by one–, the novelty of Descartes approach was that he intended 
to challenge all of them at the same time.4 
Finally, question (3), even if it was never posed by Descartes himself, was 
an unavoidable consequence of (1) and (2); it assumes that the concept that I 
use when I refer to the thing I am inside can also be applied to other things, 
which might exist in the outer world. That point gives rise to what is called the 
conceptual problem of other minds,5 which does not come to light with moral 
question (3’). The concept of life involved in (3’), unlike the concept of mind 
we find in (3), may be applied to oneself or another person indistinctly, with no 
particular asymmetry, since our lives take place in one and the same world.6 
all those Cartesian questions have two aspects in common: 
They are posed from a methodological position of radical Scepticism.
2  The origin of this maze might be in the arguable use of «I» as a kind of referential 
proper name; for an alternative and critical view of this idea, see g. E. M. anscombe’s classic 
essay «The First Person», in S. guttenplan (ed.), Mind and Language. oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1975, 45-65.
3  «Idealism and Greek Philosophy: What Descartes Saw and Berkeley Missed», The 
Philosophical Review, 91:1 (1982), 3-40. 
4  The difference in scope of Sceptical doubts before and after Descartes is explained 
by J. L. bermúdez as a transit from the idea that (a) for all my perceptual beliefs, it is possible 
that any of those beliefs might be mistaken, to the one that (b) it is possible for all my perceptual 
beliefs to be mistaken. The change in scope of the possibility operator makes admissible the 
idea that the whole world might just be an illusion. «The originality of Cartesian Scepticism: 
Did It have ancient or Mediaeval antecedents?», History of Philosophy Quarterly, 17 (2000), 
333-360. For an alternative view, see Gail Fine, «Descartes and Ancient Skepticism: Reheated 
Cabbage?», The Philosophical Review, 109:2 (2000), 195-234.
5  a. avramides, Other Minds. London: routledge, 2001.
6  Question (3) is built on the alleged invisibility of other minds, which are supposed 
not to be accessible to the Self with the same certitude he is present to himself. There is also a 
particular kind of invisibility involved in (3’), but it is of a very different kind. The difficulty 
to make sensible judgements about the intentions and desires of others is a common place in 
Renaissance moral literature; but the reason generally adduced for that difficulty is that we are 
not so acquainted with their lives as we are with our own. 
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They request absolute and immovable certitude as an answer.
Those are two sides of the same coin, since neither can be conceived wi-
thout the other: radical doubt can only be solved by radical assurance, and an 
absolute need for certitude can only be satisfied if we are able to confront even 
the most excessive of doubts. For that reason, Scepticism has traditionally been 
assumed as the starting point of Cartesianism, and Michel de Montaigne, the 
most influential Sceptic of the previous century, as one of the main precedents 
of modern subjectivism. however, my aim in this paper is to show that, even 
if Montaigne’s Scepticism was implicitly assumed by Descartes as a challenge 
–and, by the same token, radicalized far beyond its original model–, the very 
reason why Descartes adopted his new perspective is to be found in (b), rather 
than in (a). I.e., what led Descartes to the reformulation of previous questions 
was the moral need for certitude; a need he probably did inherit from Montaig-
ne, although not from his Sceptical facet, but most likely from the Stoic one. 
In few words: the route to solipsism might not have been the Sceptical doubt 
about knowledge, but the Stoic search for moral certitude through the rational 
narrowing down of the self. Noticing this difference will not only help us unders-
tand the reasons that led Descartes to reformulate old questions in a brand-new 
manner; it might also explain why many people persist even today in the kind 
of puzzles and dead ends that show up from that particular perspective.
II. the standard vIew
In contrast to Descartes, Montaigne was not a professional philosopher, not 
to mention a scientist, but what we would now call a dilettante. he was in fact a 
man of law, who resigned his position as magistrate at the relatively early age of 
37 in order to retire to his own castle and devote the rest of his life to the muses. 
It was 1570 and he had dedicated too much time to the world: the moment had 
come to follow the old advice of wisdom –gnosce te ipsum– and undertake 
the task of knowing himself. The problem then was that this inner space he 
expected to know and cultivate in solitude proved to be terribly unpredictable, 
as he reflected in his early essay «De l’oisiveté».7 In Dupré’s words, «rather 
than providing a ground for certitude as it later did for Descartes, the nature of 
the self is for Montaigne the source of all uncertainty».8 Contrary to Descartes’ 
related experience, when he was in the privacy of his chamber warming himself 
by the famous stove, Montaigne found no assurance in the lonely familiarity with 
himself, but just a mess that he would try to order through the act of writing, 
not knowing exactly the aim of his task, or the way to achieve it.
7  M. de Montaigne, The Complete Essays, tr. M. a. Screech. London: Penguin Books, 
1991 (I.8, 31). Letters a, b, C stand for the three main editions (1580/82, 1588 and 1595).
8  Passage to modernity. New haven: yale University Press, 1993, 115.
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In the book he published ten years later, the first edition of his Essays, he 
offered to the public the results of this writing task, introducing himself as a 
follower of ancient Sceptics. Acknowledging his own ignorance, he was not 
intending to produce well founded opinions or definitively stated truths in his 
work, but simply essaying himself through his writing: testing his own abilities, 
developing his judgement facing such different commonplaces as the splendour 
of the ancient romans, the decrepitude of his coevals, exotic customs of faraway 
places, our inability to have a real faith, or the different attitudes that can be 
found towards war, sexuality or family. While writing the book he noticed that 
all these issues were just excuses that allowed the appearance of its real subject: 
Montaigne was writing about these topics to make us see the glass through which 
they were being looked at. The very subject of his book was the writer himself. 
what he was showing us were his own faculties in action, being applied to that 
formless set of matters. Contrary to the appearances, he was the matter of his 
own book: «je suis moy-mesmes la matiere de mon livre».9
at this point we might be tempted to say, as many others have done, that the 
object Montaigne was pointing at was his own Self, but the use of that expression 
is problematic, since the very noun was lacking at the time. In fact, one of the 
most appealing traits of Montaigne’s introspective writing is that he was unable 
to talk about his Self, but only about himself, since the French pronoun moi only 
began to have a non deictic use at the end of the sixteenth century.10 Montaigne 
was able to talk about his raison, his jugement, his discourse, his intelligence, 
his conscience or his esprit, but could not talk about that Self who allegedly 
owns all those faculties. however, disregarding this linguistic limitation (and 
the significant cognitive difference that it involves), the work of Montaigne has 
been considered helpless for its unsolved Scepticism to find an answer to the 
question ‘what am I?’ In turn, Descartes is supposed to have pointed out half a 
9  The Complete Essays, «To the reader».
10  Many scholars have already pointed to this linguistic deficit in the Essays: see for 
instance C. b. brush, From the Perspective of the Self: Montaigne’s Self-Portrait. New York: 
Fordham University Press, 1994, 215; I. Maclean, Montaigne philosophe. Paris: PUF, 1996, 70; 
T. Cave, «Fragments d’un moi futur: de Pascal a Montaigne», in Pré-histoires. geneva: Droz, 
1999, 111-28. I focus on its philosophical implications in La Extrañeza de Sí Mismo. Identidad 
y Alteridad en Michel de Montaigne. Sevilla: Fénix Editora, 2005, 131-6. Most English trans-
lations of the Essais miss this interesting point, even John Florio’s first one; e.g. he translates 
«Il n’est description pareille en difficulté à la description de soy-mesmes, ny certes en utilité» 
(Les Essais, ed. Pierre Villey. Paris: PUF, 1965, 378) for «There is no description so hard, nor 
so profitable, as is the description of a mans own self» (Essayes. London, 1603, 219). and 
nowadays Screech translates «Me peignant pour autruy, je me suis peint en moy de couleurs 
plus nettes que n’estoyent les miennes premieres» (PUF, p. 665) for «by portraying myself for 
others I have portrayed my own self within me in clearer colours than I possessed at first», (The 
Complete Essays, 2.18, 755). My emphasis in both cases.
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century later, with clearness and distinction, what Montaigne had only intuited: 
that that «Self», the only lifeboat available in the shipwreck of Scepticism, is in 
fact a res cogitans: a thinking thing whose essence is crystalline and transpa-
rent to itself. In the deepest doubt, the clearest certitude. as alexander Koyré 
brilliantly remarked, «The Discourse on Method […] is a reply to the Essais. 
To the sad story told by Montaigne, the story of a defeat, Descartes opposes his 
own, the story of a decisive victory».11 
This account of the story is what I call the standard view. I do not agree with 
it –as can be expected from the label I chose for it–, and in what follows I will 
try to reappraise it. The transit from Montaigne’s doubts to Descartes certitude, 
from the discursive exploration of himself to the substantive determination of 
the Self, might be better described otherwise.12
III. stoICIsm and the need for CertItude.
Montaigne was not significantly influenced by ancient Scepticism when he 
retired to his castle and began to write his Essays, since he did not even know 
yet the works of Sextus Empiricus that were to change his mind in such a deep 
way.13 on the contrary, he was following the advice of roman Stoics, whose 
work he had been reading for years. He was not particularly interested in their 
metaphysical conception of the world, or in their epistemology, but mostly in 
their way of life: an ideal of wisdom gathered in a large list of precepts about 
how one should think and behave in order to attain rational autonomy, and 
11  Quote from his «Introduction» to r. Descartes, Philosophical Writings. London: 
Nelson, 1969, xiv. Etienne gilson had already turned this interpretation into the standard ac-
count by pointing out that «the philosophy of Descartes was a desperate struggle to emerge from 
Montaigne’s scepticism», The Unity of Philosophical Experience. New York: C. Scribner’s sons, 
1937, 127. With a striking expression, he puts in Descartes’ mouth the famous lines «I was in the 
world to rid the world of Montaigne; don’t you grant me the benefit of his indulgent scepticism» 
(ibid, 151).
12  In contrast to the genetic interpretation that can be found in gilson or Koyré, our read-
ing will be in the line of Léon Brunschvicg’s also canonical view, when he considers the works 
of Montaigne, Descartes and Pascal as different speakers that take part in a debate: one could 
prevail over the others in a particular moment, but that doesn’t mean that the rest have been left 
behind. They are not successive phases or stages in the development of one same argument, but 
different voices whose counterpoint is constitutive of philosophy itself. See Descartes et Pascal 
lecteurs de Montaigne. Paris: Pocket, 1942/1995, 190.
13  ancient Scepticism had attracted little attention in France before 1562, when henri 
Estienne published a Latin translation of the Outlines of Pyrrhonism. according to Pierre Vil-
ley, Montaigne did not read Sextus Empiricus until 1575 (see his edition of Les Essais, op. cit., 
LIX).
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become powerful enough to confront the strokes of fortune with the firmness 
of reason.14 
according to their master Epictetus and his famous Enchridion, the first 
step in that course was learning to distinguish what belongs to you from what 
belongs to others: 
Some things are under our control, while others are not under our control. 
Under our control are conception, choice, desire, aversion, and, in a word, 
everything that is our own doing; not under our control are our body, our 
property, reputation, office, and, in a word, everything that is not our own 
doing.15
It is not difficult to see here, from a moral point of view, the germ of modern 
distinction between the mental (judgement, intention, desire…) and the physical 
(body, wealth, political power…). The division between what is inner and what 
is outer stems from the opposition between what belongs to oneself and what 
is foreign. It is the very constitution and consistency of the Self, as a project of 
absolute free will, which is at play.16 
Furthermore, the things under our control are by nature free, unhindered, and 
unimpeded; while the things not under our control are weak, servile, subject 
to hindrance, and not our own.17
14  This aspect of stoicism is receiving special attention since Foucault (see «Technologies 
of the Self», in Ethics, Subjectivity and Truth. New York: The New York Press, 2002, 223-251) 
and P. hadot (Exercices spirituels et philosophie antique. Paris: Etudes augustiniennes, 1981). 
For an interpretation of Montaigne from a foucaultian perspective, see M. rieger, ‘Ästhetik der 
Existenz’? Eine Interpretation von Michel Foucaults Konzept der ‘Technologien des Selbst’ 
anhand der Essais von Michel de Montaigne. berlin: waxmann, 1997; J. Navarro-reyes, «Le 
divin interlocuteur: le souci de soi, la confession et l’essai», in P. Desan (ed.), Dieu à nostre 
commerce et société: Montaigne et la théologie. genève: Librairie Droz, 2008, 221-240; or Z. 
Zalloua, «Montaigne, Seneca, and ‘le Soing de la Culture de l’ame’». Montaigne Studies, XXI 
(2009), 155-168.
15  Epictetus, «The Manual», in The Discourses as Reported by Arrian, The 
Manual, and Fragments, tr. w.a. oldfather. Cambridge, Mass: harvard University Press, 1925, 
II, 483. 
16  José Medina has recently criticized the modern notion of subjectivity by denouncing 
that «when we construe the relationship between the subject and her experiential contents in terms 
of ownership and mastery, we structure subjectivity according to the model of total subordination 
and submission to a sovereign power with full control over oneself.» Speaking from Elsewhere: 
A New Contextualist Perspective on Meaning, Identity, and Discursive Agency. albany: State 
University of New York Press, 2006, 125. What I am exploring here is the historical origin of 
this conception of subjectivity as «ownership and mastery».
17  Epictetus, op. cit., 483.
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Most human beings mistake themselves for something else, not recognizing 
the real limits of their own existences. However, if your main concern is taking 
care of yourself in order to become a better being, you should first of all restrict 
the acceptance of what you actually are to its minimum expression. The first 
task of the Stoic is therefore shaping the Self or, in richard Sorabji’s words,18 
narrowing it down in order to define its inner, independent, and –as they would 
later be called– purely mental features. Those are the only ones that really do 
matter: not our physical capacities, our belongings, or our wealth; not even our 
children, or our partners. It is only in the inner world, the seat of the soul, where 
quietude and self-assurance can be attained. and within this inner space, there 
is a particular level where all the project of rational autonomy relies on: the 
proairesis, i.e., our capacity to decide where to place our interests, and how to 
integrate events in our moral set of priorities. according to Sorabji, Epictetus 
inherits this concept from aristotle, but he introduced crucial changes in it: 
proairesis, for Epictetus, is completely under our command, and nobody, not 
even god himself, could constrain it if we did not allow him to do it. only your 
proairesis can control your proairesis. Everything that happens in the world 
around you, or even in your own body, is heteronomous and unpredictable –at 
least from your limited perspective–; but it is up to you to decide –in an act 
which is conceived more as a cognitive judgement than as an act of will or 
power– whether those events are worth worrying about or not. For instance: 
any event that ordinary people would conceive as pernicious –such as illness, 
poverty, imprisonment, slavery, or even the death of a beloved being– can only 
affect our inner space if we decide to assume it as evil, and this decision is, 
according to Epictetus, completely up to us.19 If we constrained our affects to 
that inner space, we would reinforce our hegemonikon, i.e., the governing part 
of our soul, and our mind would thus be in the way to rationality, not impelled 
by the kind of passions that usually perturb ordinary people. Needless to say, 
Stoics also promoted a strong commitment to public life and political action; 
but, in order properly to fulfil those tasks, the subject should keep imperturbable 
the site of his reason, and therefore should always keep in mind that caring too 
much about what does not belong to that inner space –and depending thus too 
18  Self: Ancient and Modern Insights about Individuality, Life and Death. oxford: oUP, 
2006, 181-97.
19  In order to achieve this project, it is crucial to assume Chrysippus’ conception of emo-
tions as cognitive judgements, and not as some kind of passive sufferance. Although the existence 
of what would latter be analysed by Seneca as «first movements» must be acknowledged –bodily 
reactions out of our command–, real emotions are not that, since a positive and active acceptance 
by the soul is required in order to transform that bodily reaction into a mental event. and that 
judgment would be what Epictetus considers our own doing. See Sorabji’s Emotion and Peace 
of Mind. From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation. oxford: oUP, 2000.
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much on others– is the first mistake that moves him away from self-sufficiency, 
freedom, and pure rationality.20
by the time he retired from active life Montaigne was deeply impressed by 
this model of wisdom. although Epictetus might be the most radical example of 
the selfish tendency in classic Stoicism, and his work was quite widespread in 
the 16th century France,21 it is not clear if Montaigne read his work directly.22 
he certainly read some neo-Stoic authors such as Juste Lipse, but it was mainly 
from Seneca that he received that influence, as well as from quotes and references 
to old Stoicism that he probably found in Cicero, Plutarch or Diogenes Laërtius. 
Outside the world of books, his prematurely deceased friend Étienne de La 
boétie had represented for him the living proof that the Stoic way of life was 
still attainable, in spite of the decadence of present times: an existence strictly 
ruled by the strengths of reason, where pure self-sufficiency and self-control 
would have been fully achieved. This admiration for Stoic models is evident in 
the oldest layers of his earlier essays, such as «Que philosopher c’est apprendre 
à mourir» or «De la solitude», where he states: 
[A] We should have wives, children, property and, above all, good health… 
if we can: but we should not become so attached to them that our happiness 
depends on them. We should set aside a room, just for ourselves, at the back 
of the shop, keeping it entirely free and establishing there our true liberty, 
our principal solitude and asylum. Within it our normal conversation should 
be of ourselves, with ourselves, so privy that no commerce or communication 
with the outside world should find a place there […]. We have a soul able to 
turn in on herself; she can keep herself company; she has the wherewithal to 
attack, to defend, to receive and to give.23
A conception of interiority as a self-standing bulwark is rising from this 
moral need for certitude: not something that could be found into oneself, just 
20  See g. baldwin, «Individual and Self in the Late renaissance», The Historical Journal, 
44:2 (2001), 353.
21  The Enchiridion had already been translated from Greek by Antoine Moulin in 1544 
–as Le Manuel d’Epictéte– and by andré rivandeau in 1567 –as La doctrine d’Epictete.
22  according to Pierre Villey, both Montaigne’s implicit reference to Epictetus in I.14 
–which was also inscribed in one of the wooden joists in his library– and the explicit one in II.12 
(pages 50 and 489 of his edition of Les Essais) stem from Stobée’s collection of Greek sentences. 
One copy of its 1559 edition is known to have belonged to his library. He also owned a Latin 
translation of the Enchiridion within the works of Politien, but there is no decisive proof that he 
read it –see r. Crescenzo, «Epictetus», in P. Desan (ed.), Dictionnaire de Michel de Montaigne, 
Paris: Champion, 2004, 331-332. Despite the lack of direct references from Montaigne to Epic-
tetus, both were famously rejoined in Pascal’s «Entretien avec M. de Saci», Oeuvres Complètes, 
ed. de Louis Lafuma. Paris: Seuil, 1963.
23  The Complete Essays, 1.39, 270.
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waiting for inspection, but a kind of shelter one should construct through exercise 
and practice; a place where we could refuge from any eventuality fate might 
have in store for us. 
What I would like to suggest is that this sort of moral solipsism can be 
understood as a prefiguration of the modern epistemological one. A modern 
strong internalist position would claim that inner mediators, whether ideas or 
perceptions, play an unavoidable role in any knowledge we have about the outer 
world. Knowledge of those cogitata would be attained with a kind of certitude 
and authority that would be unachievable for any other knowledge whose object 
would be placed in the outer world. There is a strong resemblance between this 
epistemological idea and the one of proairesis control in Stoic moral. Quoting 
Epictetus in essay I.40, Montaigne asserts that men are tormented by the opinions 
they have of things and not by things themselves; in a similar sense, in essay 
III.9 he claims that everything we can posses or enjoy is in a way mediated 
by our phantasie, i.e. we do not posses or enjoy things themselves, but inner 
mediators within our souls. The project of Stoic rationality is attainable for us 
because we do not experience facts themselves, but a representation of them 
that is under our control, since it can be accepted or rejected by us at the level 
the proairesis. The modern internalist conception of consciousness –what has 
been called the Cartesian Theatre, in which we do not see things themselves, 
but only inner representations of them– is just the application of this same con-
ceptual scheme, not on moral issues any more, but on epistemic ones. Just as 
Stoics assured that we do not suffer what happens, but only our opinions of what 
happens, modern internalism assumes that we do not know things themselves 
directly, but only through our representations of those things. both ideas are 
supported by one same principle: we only come into contact with outer events 
through inner mediators. 
Under this light, it might be sensible to assess that the internalist episte-
mological position, according to which any knowledge at all must somehow be 
anchored in an inner content, keeps important traces of the Stoic moral idea that 
we can take control of inner representations. Both seem in fact to be impelled 
by one same need: the need for inner certitude in our search for rationality. and 
both rely on one same assumption: that judgement is an act of will, which can 
be under our command as far as it’s content remains in the inner space of the 
soul. Just as we can find absolute liberty in the control of inner representations, 
we can find absolute authority in their phenomenological description. 
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Iv. sCeptICIsm and the balanCe of the self
although it has sometimes been questioned, nowadays it is commonplace 
that, around 1575, Montaigne suffered a kind of «Sceptical crisis»24: after 
learning about the life and ideas of Pyrrho of Elis through the work of Sextus 
Empiricus, his initial trust in the Stoic model began to tremble. he wrote then 
his famous «apology for raymond Sebond», where the possibility of human 
knowledge was denied: since our poor intellectual forces are too weak to under-
take the task of science, the intention of attaining metaphysical or theological 
knowledge is shown as an absurd delusion of human vanity.
If Montaigne’s main contribution to the history of philosophy had just been 
this Scepticism about knowledge, it would arguably have been minor. Other Re-
naissance authors –such as Cornelius agrippa in his De incertitudine et vanitate 
scientiarum, or Francisco Sánchez in his Quod nihil scitur– probably tackled 
this task with more clarity, systematicity, and rigor than the essayist. Neverthe-
less, there are many other ways of doubting, beyond the doubt of knowledge. 
In this sense, the relevance of Montaigne’s Scepticism might not stem from its 
epistemological aspect, but from its moral and an ontological ones.25 Sceptical 
arguments were put forward as a particular lesson of humility: an attack against 
the self-assurance of the human being, who believes that he is the main and 
principal being in creation, when in fact he is nothing but «the jester of the 
farce».26 but that was just a limited step within a wider project of humiliation, 
which was already widely analyzed by hugo Friedrich.27 our impossibility to 
attain knowledge is just an example of what we cannot reach: absolute moral 
virtue, rationality, autonomy, and, in general, the Stoic ideal of wisdom that, 
according to this chastened Montaigne, is far beyond our scope: 
[B] I am well aware that there have been sages who have adopted a different 
course: [...]. Let us not attempt to follow such examples: we shall never manage 
it. Such men have made up their minds to watch resolutely and unmoved the 
destruction of their country, which once held and governed all their affection. 
For common souls like ours there is too much strain, too much savagery in 
that. [...]
If a man cannot attain to that noble Stoic impassibility, let him hide in the 
24  See Pierre Villey, Les sources et l’évolution des Essais de Montaigne. Paris: hachette, 
1908. The idea had been put forward by F. Strowski in his Montaigne. Paris: F. alcan, 1906.
25  as J.-y. Pouilloux points out, «Ce n’est plus en termes de connaissance, mais d’exis-
tence que se trouve désormais posée la question de l’identité». Montaigne: l’éveil de la pensée. 
Paris: Champion, 1995.
26  The Complete Essays, 3.9, 1133.
27  Op. cit., 104-155.
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lap of this peasant insensitivity of mine.28
The relevance of Scepticism in Montaigne’s work resides in the fact that 
it shows the impossibility of attaining the highest peaks of rationality and self-
sufficiency, being therefore a terrible blow against the aim Stoics had tried to 
fulfil. Beyond the project of autonomy, independence, and pure rationality, we 
attend in the Essais to what has been called «the collapse of the autonomous 
self».29 The essayist is forced to recognise that he cannot keep control of his 
own identity, since both his bodily and his mental features respond unavoidably 
to accidental processes where the Self is not even present.30
however, after this «process of de-stoïcization»,31 this incapability to retain 
an absolut control of oneself will not be considered as a failure any more: the 
project of building an inner, inaccessible Self is abandoned, and dependence 
on otherness is progressively assumed by Montaigne as some kind of bene-
ficial tendency.32 In this light, the knowledge of one’s own identity becomes 
a task where the Self cannot just rely on its own capacities, but must assume 
unpredictable exchanges in regard to what had been previously considered as 
«other»: firstly the world,33 and secondly other minds.34 Montaigne scholars 
have thus shown during the last decades that the identity of the Self is acquired 
through the construction of a linguistic self-portrait, only attainable because it 
is offered to his readers.35
28  The Complete Essays, 3.10, 1150-3.
29  Patrick Henry, «Recognition of the Other and Avoidance of the Double. The Self and 
the other in the Essais of Montaigne», Stanford French Review, 6:2-3 (1982), 187.
30  The Complete Essays, 3.8, p. 1058. on the limited presence and control of consciousness 
over the mind in the Essays see chapter II of my La extrañeza de sí mismo, op. cit., 69-137.
31  See Z. Zalloua, Montaigne and the Ethics of Skepticism. Charlottesville, Va.: Rookwood 
Press, 2005, 11.
32  I have analized the effects of this dialectic between self and other from different pre-
spectives in Pensar sin certezas: Montaigne y el arte de conversar. Madrid: Fondo de Cultura 
Económica, 2007. 
33  See for instance The Complete Essays, 1.26, p. 177.
34  See The Complete Essays, 3.13, p. 1221.
35  The performative character of Montaigne’s text constantly requires uptake and response 
from his public, as andré Tournon points out: «The auto-exegesis of the Essais does not thus 
close upon itself, and neither Montaigne’s reflections, nor the text with incorporated commentary 
which it produces are reduced to a soliloquy. For everything in this book is arranged [...] to solicit 
the reader’s replies and his choices». «Self-Interpretation in Montaigne’s Essais», Yale French 
Studies, 64 (1983), 72. See also his Montaigne: la glose et l’essai. Lyon: Presses Universitaires 
de Lyon, 1983, 294. In the same way, anthony wilden proved from the perspective of philoso-
phy of communication that «the introspection and withdrawal from society [that Montaigne] 
promoted led to the discovery that self-knowledge can only come through examination of one’s 
relationship to others, rather than from the isolated examination of oneself». «Par divers moyens 
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In contrast to the standard reading of Montaigne that philosophers like 
Gilson or Koyré have usually done, the main insight in his work might not have 
been the critical moment of Scepticism, not to say its limited epistemological 
facet, but the effects that a wider sense of Scepticism had in his notion of wis-
dom in general, and his conception of Self in particular. The Stoic inclination to 
egotism found a counterbalance in this Sceptical antithesis, and Montaigne had 
to develop his essays seeking to balance Stoicism and Scepticism, arrogance of 
loneliness and humility of interaction.36 all of that which had been neglected or 
denied by Stoic ideals had to be reassumed by a new model of wisdom, usually 
identified as a kind of neo-hedonism, much more attached to the body and its 
pleasures, and not obsessed any more by pure rationality, self-sufficiency and 
absolute autonomy.
Villey’s triadic conception of Montaigne’s evolution (from Stoicism to 
Scepticism, and from Scepticism to hedonism) has often been criticized. 
however, it must be underlined that it should not be understood as a matter of 
radical, distinguished stages in Montaigne’s thought –as Villey himself occa-
sionally seemed to claim–, since both the admiration for Stoic ideals and the 
echoes of Scepticism still remain even in the latest layers of his text. Instead 
of that, what we find in the Essays is, according to Starobinski’s formulation, 
a living mouvement where the Stoic proneness to build a purely autonomous 
Self is balanced by his acknowledgement that rational isolation is not the way 
to attain wisdom.37 
It is this movement, attained through the balance between Self and others, 
what kept Montaigne’s narrative alive. In this sense, although the tradition has 
given much more relevance to Montaigne’s individualist tendency, the Essays 
on arrive à pareille fin: a reading of Montaigne», Modern Language Notes, 83 (1968), 577-97.
36  I thus fully agree with Zalloua when he claims that «Contrary to being an impediment 
to ethical thought, Montaigne’s skepticism, epitomized by his interrogative ‘Que sçay-je?’ (‘What 
do I know?’), I would argue, generates a concern for and openness toward the other, precisely 
the opposite of the kind of relation to alterity found in René Descartes, whose hyperbolic doubt 
and skepticism can lead to solipsism (the advent of a ‘solitary’ cogito), or to the epistemological 
impasse known today as the Problem of Other Minds», Montaigne and the Ethics of Skepticism, 
op. cit., 4. See also C. Collier, «The self in Montaigne and Descartes. From portraiture to indi-
gence.» De Philosophia, XIII:2 (1997), 256.
37  Montaigne en Mouvement, Paris: Gallimard, 1983. As Tarrête points out in a painstaking 
article, from Jean-Yves Pouilloux and André Tournon important works «Le débat, désormais, se 
déplace donc: il est moins question de savoir si M. est stoïcien ou autre chose que de mettre en 
évidence quel usage il fait de la philosohie stoïcienne». «Stoïcisme», in Philippe Desan (ed.), 
Dicctionnaire de Michel de Montaigne, op. cit., 937. what Pouilloux says about Montaigne’s 
Scepticism could also be claimed about his alleged Stoicism and Epicureanism, i.e. that they 
are not to be understood as doctrines, but as attitudes. See his «Socrate», Bulletin de la Société 
des Amis de Montaigne, 41-42 (2006), 185. 
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do not tend more to the isolation of the Self than to the acknowledgement of its 
dependence on others.38 
v. how the cogito upset the balanCe
The moment has come to reconsider the transit from Montaigne’s Essays 
to Descartes’ Discourse on Method. as I previously pointed out, it is widely 
accepted that Descartes’ method of doubt has its roots in sixteenth century 
Scepticism, particularly in Montaigne’s approach, whose cultural influence was 
quite widespread in the France of the seventeenth century.39 however, it could 
be alleged that that influence was in fact minor, since Descartes’ discussion of 
Scepticism was not central in his work at all. His references to it are quite rare 
and occasional, and he was certainly not a Sceptic himself, but an adversary of 
Scepticism who only confronted it explicitly as a show of strength, once he found 
himself confident enough to defeat that locus communis with the argument of 
the cogito.40 In any case, although Sceptic doubts could be the most evident trace 
of Montaigne’s work in Descartes’ one, it probably was not the deepest one. It 
could be argued that, under the surface, and probably unwittingly, he was more 
deeply influenced by a sort of Stoicism that he probably found in the Essays 
–but that he could have also received from other philosophers who also show 
an important proneness to Stoicism between the 16th and 17th centuries, such 
as Juste Lipse, Pierre Charron or guillaume Du Vair.41 It is not difficult to see 
38  I would endorse Jules brody’s words when he says that «Il me paraît pourtant aberrant 
de célébrer exclusivement, ou même principalement, en Montaigne, l’inventeur de la conscience 
de soi et le père de la subjectivité dite ‘moderne’». «Montaigne et le sujet mixte», in E. Kushner 
(ed.), La problématique du sujet chez Montaigne. Paris: Champion, 1995, 52.
39  See R. H. Popkin, The History of Skepticism from Erasmus to Spinoza. Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1979; and L. brunschvicg, op. cit. Étienne Gilson finds almost 
thirty textual reminiscences of The Essays in his commented edition of Descarte’s Discours de la 
Méthode. Paris: Vrin, 1976; some of them are studied in more depth by geneviève rodis-Lewis 
in «Dout pratique et doute spéculatif chez Montaigne et Descartes», Revue Philosophique de la 
France et de l’étranger, 182:4 (1992), 439-449. P. Chamizo-Domínguez has pointed out similitu-
des and differences between Montaigne and Descartes, both in «La présence de Montaigne dans 
la philosophie du XVIIe siécle,» Bulletin de la Société des Amis de Montaigne, 11-12 (1988), 
72-86 and «El Discurso del Método de Descartes como ensayo», Aporía, IV:15-16 (1982), 69-
83.
40  See J. broughton, Descartes’ Method of Doubt. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2001. Descartes was thus accepting a challenge that had been previously faced by others, like 
Marin Mersenne in his 1625 book La vérité des sciences contre les sceptiques ou pyrrhoniens, 
ed. D. Descotes. Paris: Champion, 2003. Mersenne seemed to share with Descartes the same at-
titude towards sceptical doubts, as Descotes points out in his introduction to the aforementioned 
edition (p. 22). I am thankful to J. L. Sánchez Tierra for bringing this point to my attention.
41  general accounts of the Neo-Stoic movement in early modern thought can be found 
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that Descartes’ intellectual quest, from the Regulae to Les passions de l’âme, 
was guided by a strong need for certitude, whose origins are to be found in the 
social and political situation of his time;42 a need that was to be satisfied, as in 
the Stoic tradition, by the narrowing down of the Self, in search for refuge in 
the inner control of mental representations. as an echo of the Sceptic topic, we 
find in Descartes’ provisory code of moral (third maxim) the idea that power 
to confront fate remains within oneself:
[A]lways to try to conquer myself rather than fortune, and to change my 
desires rather than the order of the world, and generally to accustom myself 
to believing that there is nothing that is completely within our power except 
our thoughts, so that, after we have done our best regarding things external 
to us, everything that is lacking for us to succeed is, from our point of view, 
absolutely impossible. […] But I admit that long exercise is needed as well 
as frequently repeated meditation in order to become accustomed to looking 
at everything from this point of view [...].43
It is well known that Descartes’ explicit attitude towards Stoic moral was 
not very favourable, since he considered its maxims as inhuman efforts to escape 
from our finite nature, and thus developed a more permissive and benevolent 
position with respect to passions. But, beyond this superficial distance, the Car-
tesian distinction between the inner and the outer world –the conscious, free 
mind on the one hand and the extended, mechanical world on the other– could 
hardly not have its roots in the Stoic classification of events between those that 
depend on us and those that are out of our control.44 It is not my aim here to 
prove any direct borrowing on the part of Descartes, but I think that this and 
other significant passages make this reading quite compelling.45 The incontro-
in L. Zanta, La Renaissance du stoïcisme au XVIe siècle. Paris: h. Champion, 1914; g. abel, 
Stoizismus und frühe Neuzeit. berlin: walter de gruyter, 1978; and D. Carabin, Les idées stoïcien-
nes dans la littérature morale des XVIe et XVIIe siècles (1575-1642). Paris: honoré Champion, 
2004.
42  The roots of this need, according to S. Toulmin (Cosmopolis: the Hidden Agenda of 
Modernity. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1992, 45-88), can be found in the social and 
political crisis that followed the regicide of henry IV, and the fall of his model of tolerant coex-
istence between different religious beliefs.
43  Discourse on method, tr. D. A. Cress. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1998, 
III, 15. As Brunschvicg pointed out, «le comportement provisoire [de Descartes] reflète l’attitude 
que Montaigne recommandait à titre définitif.» Op. cit., 109. On possible influences of Montaigne 
on Descartes’ moral ideas see M. g. Paulson, The possible influence of Montaigne’s Essais on 
Descartes’ Treatise on the passions. Lanham, Md: University Press of america, 1988.
44  We follow here L. Zanta’s interpretation of Descartes’ work, that finds behind his 
apparent refusal of Stoicism a deeper assumption of its central claims. Op. cit., 337-339.
45  a similar Stoic inclination can be found in other places, but a more detailed study of 
this influence should be carried out. For instance, Descartes writes in a letter to Elisabeth: «Or 
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vertible and immovable evidence of the cogito –starting point to reconstruct the 
building of science– seems to be achieved exactly in the same way the Stoics 
proposed to regain control of the proairesis: by remaining in the inside, i.e. in 
the space of representations, and thus be assured that nothing external will be 
out of our control. The same step that had been taken by the Stoics as a strategy 
in the search for moral independence was epistemically taken by Descartes in 
the search for gnoseological certitude. 
Sceptic doubts were thus defeated, thanks to a double movement: firstly, 
epistemic Scepticism –what do I know?– came to the foreground, gaining special 
prominence; and secondly, moral Scepticism –how shall I overcome my human 
limitations?– was defeated by the idea of method, since the task of developing 
the first apodictic truth of the cogito would not demand inhuman strengths that 
would be beyond our scope.46 and once Scepticism was allegedly defeated, 
the Stoic tendency became unbalanced, taking control of modern philosophy, 
and allowing the appearance of the concept of mind as an inner space, whose 
particular features –autonomy, subjectivity and rationality– forced philosophers 
to attribute to it a different kind of reality, namely, a res cogitans. 
In this light, the issues of the substantive character of the Self, the existence 
of an outer world and the very possibility of other minds are not to be considered 
as the effect of radical Scepticism; on the contrary, they can be seen as the result 
of the defeat of moderate Scepticism by radical needs of Stoicism. It was the 
will of certitude and control what lead to the reification of the Self, its distancing 
from the world, and the impossibility to attain the minds of others; a need that 
simply did not stem from Scepticism. The outer world and other minds were 
distanced from Cartesian Self because they prevented its achievement of radical 
certitude, autonomy and self-sufficiency. Their very reality became problematic 
ce qui m’a fait dire, en ce dernier sens, qu’il y a toujours plus de biens que de maux en cette 
vie, c’est le peu d’état que je crois que nous devons faire de toutes les choses qui sont hors de 
nous, et qui ne dépendent point de notre libre arbitre, à comparaison de celles qui en dépendent, 
lesquelles nous pouvons toujours rendre bonnes, lorsque nous en savons bien user; et nous 
pouvons empêcher, par leur moyen, que tous les maux qui viennent d’ailleurs, tant grands qu’ils 
puissent être, n’entrent plus avant en notre âme que la tristesse que y excitent les comédiens, 
quand ils représentent devant nous quelques actions fort funestes; mais j’avoue qu’il faut être 
fort philosophe, pour arriver jusqu’à ce point.» Oeuvres complètes de René Descartes. Charlot-
tesville, Va.: InteLex Corporation, 2001, IV, 355 (the final expression reminds a famous quote 
of Montaigne: «[C] Je ne suis pas philosophe: les maux me foullent selon qu’ils poisent», Les 
Essais, III.9, 950). See also Les passions de l’âme, in Oeuvres complètes, op. cit., III, 152.
46  See Dupré, idem. On Montaigne’s influence on the birth of the modern concept of 
method see P. Desan, Naissance de la méthode: Machiavel, La Ramée, Bodin, Montaigne, Des-
cartes. Paris: a.-g. Nizet, 1987.
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and, since the cogito was supposed not to depend on anything else to subsist, 
doors were open to different kinds of idealism and solipsism.
Strangely enough, the standard view blames Scepticism for having lead 
modern philosophy towards this impasse. but Scepticism by itself neither leads 
to solipsism nor to the other minds problem; in fact, the classic Sceptic doubts 
with others, not as an isolated thing but as a person –not as a what but as a 
who–, i.e. as someone who shares with his interlocutors the common space of 
language and action.47 The consideration of the art of conversation thus plays in 
Montaigne’s work a role which is equivalent to the one played by the Discourse 
on Method in Descartes, as a reflection on the normative constraints that govern 
our relationship with truth and knowledge. Nevertheless, there is a crucial di-
fference: Montaigne offered a set of guidelines that would help us find our own 
way in the endless universal commerce with others –that is, a way of chasing 
truth in common–, whereas Descartes tried to find a method for the isolated 
subject, in order to help him tackle the task of science in solitude.
Contrarywise to Montaigne’s quest for himself, what Descartes found 
in his cogito argument –the outset of the modern philosophical discourse on 
subjectivity– is not himself, a person that lives in the world and speaks with 
others, but his Self: a substantive entity, devoid of any deictical reference, that 
became the beginning and the end of the intellectual quest; something that does 
not belong to the outer world, and can confront the task of knowledge from the 
certitude of the inside, preserved from the possibility of failure –just like Stoics 
preserved their quietude of mind from the ups and downs of fortune. a Self far 
away and isolated from other Selves, no longer considered as interlocutors but as 
other things, whose thinking character cannot be proved but through uncertain, 
unreliable and fallible arguments. 
What a careful study of Montaigne’s influence could show us is that those 
problematic answers only make sense if we pose those specific questions; and 
that, from a different perspective, we might find much better reasons to ask 
otherwise.48
Jesús navarro-reyes es Profesor Contratado Doctor, Universidad de Sevilla y Visiting 
Scholar en el wolfson College de oxford
47  That is actually not far away from avramides’ attempt to dissolve the problem of other 
minds with what she calls «the lived position» (op. cit., part III).
48  This paper has benefited from the helpful comments of Jordi Bayod Brau, Anita Avr-
amides, Pedro J. Chamizo-Domínguez and anonymous referees from Contrastes. a previous 
version was presented in July 2005 at The royal Institute of Philosophy annual Conference: 
Narrative and Understanding Persons, at the University of hertfordshire (UK), and I am also 
thankful for various insightful comments from that audience.
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